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INTRODUCTION 
The discovery process involves the transfer of relevant and responsive 
information in litigation or government investigations from a producing 
party to a receiving party. Generally, the information that is transferred has 
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been extensively culled and distilled through the discovery process into a set 
of refined, relevant data. This data is at an extremely high risk of containing 
information that is proprietary, trade secret, commercially sensitive, or 
potentially embarrassing.1 
In traditional discovery, the biggest risk to parties’ data came from misuse 
by the opposing party.2 Unlike traditional discovery, however, discovery in 
modern complex litigation has become primarily electronic.3 The digitization 
of discovery has created new data security threats to parties’ proprietary data 
from third parties. The transfer of electronically stored information (“ESI”), 
in any instance, is antithetical to data security. As a general rule, “less data in 
fewer places is less vulnerable. In cases of sensitive information, the most 
powerful security measure remains nondisclosure.”4 But absent undue burden 
or cost, a party litigating in federal court is presumptively entitled to relevant 
information in the possession, custody, or control of their opponent.5 Without 
adequate security measures in place, the sensitive data that is produced in 
discovery is placed at risk of cyber-attacks6 or corporate espionage that may 
severely injure the producing party.7 
 
1 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Johnston & Dan Klein, The February 2016 California Attorney General’s 
Data Breach Report Sets A Standard for “Reasonable Security”—What Does This Mean for Cybersecurity 
Litigation?, BUS. L. TODAY, May 2016, at 1-2 (discussing various types of information held by 
businesses and highlighting the consequences of data security breach); see also Richard P. Campbell, 
The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 773 
(1990) (noting the importance of protective orders to shelter parties who otherwise would be required 
to respond to discovery requests from invasion of privacy by plaintiffs, the public, and the press). 
2 David J. Kessler, Jami Mills Vibbert & Alex Altman, Protective Orders in the Age of Hacking, 
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 2015, at 1. 
3 See Matthew M. Neumeier, Brian D. Hansen & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Paper Or Plastic?—The 
Hunt for Electronic Treasure During Discovery, JENNER & BLOCK (Dec. 2003), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_Mealeys_PaperPlastic.p
df [https://perma.cc/J3TY-M7VH] (describing how “[e]lectronic information and communications 
have firmly entrenched themselves in the modern business world”). 
4 Id. at *3. 
5 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
6 Law firms are specifically targeted by hackers at an alarmingly high rate. See Susan Hansen, 
Cyber Attacks Upend Attorney-Client Privilege, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 19, 2015, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-19/cyber-attacks-force-law-firms-to-improve-data-
security [https://perma.cc/H5GS-XGML] (“[A]t least 80 of the 100 biggest firms in the country . . . 
have been hacked since 2011.”); Ellen Rosen, Hackers Seek Corporate Secrets, Breach Big Law Firms, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bna.com/hackers-seek-corporate-n17179924553/ 
[https://perma.cc/AP3B-HUAN] (noting that “most big law firms have . . . been hacked”). 
7 See Kessler et al., supra note 2, at 2 (“A nonparty competitor, for example, could engage in 
cyber espionage and reap a treasure trove of trade secrets. Cyber terrorists can virtually hold an 
entire company hostage . . . .”). 
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Although a party may institute its own data security protections to defend 
from these rising threats,8 it cannot directly control the conduct of its 
opponents, their lawyers, or their vendors. Traditionally, courts have not 
articulated a specific duty, or incentive, for opposing parties to adequately 
protect their opponent’s data, and have relied on protective orders to remedy 
this malincentive and gap in the law.9 In federal court, a judge may “issue an 
order to protect a person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense.”10 The traditional use of a protective order shielded 
parties from intentional misuse of data by their opponent.11 But protective 
orders may also include provisions designed to ensure that adequate data 
security measures are put in place to protect data from third party attacks 
while stored by the opposing party.12 Some protective orders set forth 
remedial measures for instances where there is a data breach.13 
The real issues on the duty to protect an opponent’s data arise when there 
is no protective order in place, or during the negotiations of such protective 
orders. Some discovery litigation has raised questions of the receiving party’s 
obligations to protect the data of the producing party when there is no 
protective order. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,14 the Supreme Court held 
that a protective order may prohibit the dissemination of information 
obtained in discovery to the press without violating the First Amendment,15 
but did not declare whether there is a baseline obligation that prevents an 
opposing party from disclosing information learned through the discovery 
process to the press. Absent a protective order, it is unclear under Seattle Times 
what legal duty, if any, is owed by a receiving party. 
 
8 For a full discussion of recommended data security measures, see THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES: DISCOVERY, 
DISCLOSURE & DATA PROTECTION IN CIVIL LITIGATION (Transitional Ed. Jan. 2017). 
9 See generally Donald J. Rendall, Jr., Protective Orders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery 
Information: The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766, 770 (1980). 
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
11 See, e.g., Rendall, supra note 9, at 771 (describing how the protective order mechanism 
“satisfies the liberal disclosure policies underlying the discovery process” and simultaneously 
“minimizes the harm to the producing party from the release of the confidential information”). 
12 See, e.g., Model Protective Order, S.D. CAL. 1, 7, 
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Attorneys/Lists/Forms/Attachments/68/Model%20Protective%20Orde
r.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S9Q-43UD] (providing standard protective order provisions for federal court 
that require the receiving party to protect confidential and sensitive information of the producing party, 
as well as provisions that require the deletion or return of the sensitive data at the end of litigation). 
13 The Sedona Conference has addressed the need for data security provisions in protective 
orders as a means of meeting international requirements of cross-border data protection. See THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at Appendix C (recommending a Model U.S. Federal Court 
Protective Order that includes remedial measures for instances when a data breach occurs.) 
14 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
15 Id. at 33. 
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In a paper world, this issue was trivial. Standard security protocols like a 
lock and key were sufficient protective measures to secure paper documents. 
But, in an electronic data world, this question has become anything but 
trivial. The value of information stored in an electronic format has increased 
dramatically.16 There is now a pressing need for new security protocols and 
affirmative guidance under the law. 
This Comment suggests a baseline standard of care that should be owed 
by a receiving party in discovery to protect the electronic data of the 
producing party. Where immense value is present in stored data, the receiving 
party’s duty of care to protect that data is of utmost importance. Establishing 
a baseline duty of care will provide certainty under the law and will play an 
essential role in future discovery negotiations. 
One major benefit to setting a clear legal standard is certainty.17 The 
discovery world is guided by reasonableness. According to Federal Rule 
26(b)(1), discovery is only permitted when it is reasonable.18 Courts have the 
power to provide some clarity to the vague reasonableness standard by 
explicitly stating what a receiving parties’ legal obligation is under the law to 
protect their opponent’s data. Clarifying the legal standard would provide 
parties with some guidance as to what security measures are reasonable. Absent 
action by courts, legislation or regulation may specify a reasonable electronic 
security standard.19 Outside of the discovery context, some states, including 
California and Texas, have introduced regulatory regimes requiring that 
businesses provide reasonable data security measures to protect customers’ 
personal information.20 In the absence of government action, however, the 
courts may set forth a common-law baseline to guide the discovery world. 
A clear baseline standard of care will also allow parties to effectively 
negotiate an agreement over what provisions to include in a protective order 
to ensure data security. The discovery process is often the most expensive 
part of litigation.21 Yet implementing effective data security provisions entails 
 
16 See Richard K. Herrmann, Vincent J. Poppiti & David K. Sheppard, Managing Discovery in 
the Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the District of Delaware, 8 DEL. L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) 
(“We are no longer satisfied with discovering documents from the file cabinets of our adversaries. 
As technology increases, fewer and fewer documents are reduced to paper. Indeed, current statistics 
indicated that 93% of all documents in the United States are created electronically.”). 
17 See, e.g., Liong Lim, Approaches to Liability for Breaches in Data Security, 3 MACARTHUR L. 
REV., 81, 96 (1999) (listing certainty as a key element to data security law because “[p]arties must 
be able to know what standards of security are considered reasonable”). 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
19 See Lim, supra note 17, at 96 (suggesting that the government “tak[e] the bold step of 
identifying acceptable electronic security standards”). 
20 See, e.g., Johnston & Klein, supra note 1, at 1. 
21 See Statement by Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform Grp. & U.S. Chamber Inst. 
for Legal Reform, Statement on Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, in 2010 Conf. on Civ. 
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numerous considerations and strategies that entail their own costs.22 
Producing parties will want the most extensive security measures in place to 
protect their sensitive data. Receiving parties will want to spend as little 
money as is necessary to protect their opponents’ data. These misaligned 
incentives drive and prolong protective order negotiations.23 
When there is no agreement under the law as to what the default 
obligations are in discovery, there is no way for parties to know what to 
concede and where to stand their ground in negotiations about protective 
order provisions. This Comment calls on courts to set a standard that will 
provide discovery attorneys with certainty and guide attorneys in future 
protective order negotiations. 
There is no need to reinvent the wheel in setting a standard. Some data 
security scholars have suggested turning to existing rules on the duty of care in 
contract law, tort law, criminal law, or property law for setting a data security 
standard.24 The best guide to establishing a baseline standard of care owed by 
a receiving party to protect the producing party’s data lies in the property law 
principle of bailment. A bailment is a legal relationship “created by the delivery 
of personal property by one person to another in trust for a specific purpose, 
pursuant to an express or implied contract to fulfill that trust.”25 Importantly, 
after the specific purpose has been fulfilled, the delivered property is 
redelivered to the producer, “dealt with according to his directions, or kept until 
he reclaims it.”26 This Comment asserts that the receiving party gains no 
ownership interest in information obtained through discovery. Thus, the 
exchange of electronic data in discovery is akin to the creation of a bailment, 
and the existing legal standards of bailment should control. 
This Comment begins by addressing the lingering questions that were 
created by the Supreme Court’s holding in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.27 Part 
II argues that the ownership rights over data do not transfer to the receiving 
party in discovery. Part III addresses the history of the consideration of 
 
Litig. Duke Law Sch. (May 2010) 2 (“[T]he high transaction costs of litigation, and in particular the 
costs of discovery, threaten to exceed the amount at issue in all but the largest cases.”). 
22 See generally AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, SAFE AND SECURE: CYBER SECURITY 
PRACTICES FOR LAW FIRMS, A CNA PROFESSIONAL COUNSEL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND 
LAW FIRMS 5-8 https://www.cna.com/web/wcm/connect/61aec549-ac28-457b-8626-
aa791c782459/Safe_Secure_Cyber_Security_Practices.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/2MSC-
B7H2] (describing data security costs). 
23 Parties often engage in robust negotiations over electronic discovery and protective orders 
at meet-and-confer conferences. Herrmann et al., supra note 16, at 78. 
24 See Lim, supra note 17, at 90-96 (summarizing approaches to data security that span 
various legal areas). 
25 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 1 (2018). 
26 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 53:1 (4th ed 2000). 
27 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
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bailment liability to electronic information in data security breach cases. Key 
cases such as Richardson v. DSW, Inc.,28 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer 
Data Security Breach Litigation,29 and In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach 
Litigation30 dealt with the issue of whether electronic data can be personal 
property that constitutes a bailment. These cases denied the extension of 
bailment liability to the transfer of electronic data, reasoning that there was no 
delivery of property that is required for the creation of a bailment. But these 
cases did not deal directly with the transfer of data in the context of discovery. 
Part IV sets the stage for the application of bailment principles to 
electronic discovery by explaining that electronic data is intangible property 
that may be bailed. Part V lays out the requirements for the creation of a 
bailment of electronic data. In Part V, I also argue that the transfer of 
electronic data in discovery satisfies the elements for the creation of a 
bailment. Part VI then explains the standard of care that should apply to the 
receiving party in discovery to protect its opponent’s data. Finally, this 
Comment concludes by reflecting on the impact establishing a baseline 
standard of care would have on the discovery process. 
I. QUESTIONS LINGERING AFTER SEATTLE TIMES CO. V. RHINEHART 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Seattle Times raised several key issues that 
are essential to this analysis. Seattle Times dealt with a defamation action after 
a newspaper published several disparaging articles about the spiritual leader of 
the Aquarian Foundation, a religious organization.31 During the discovery 
process, the Foundation refused to produce its list of donors and members.32 
The trial court ordered the Foundation to produce the information but also 
issued a protective order which prohibited the Seattle Times “from publishing, 
disseminating, or using the information in any way except where necessary to 
prepare for and try the case.”33 
Wishing to publish the list of donors and members of the Foundation in 
its newspaper, the Seattle Times appealed the protective order.34 The 
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the protective order, concluding that 
the dissemination of the donor information would “result in annoyance, 
embarrassment and even oppression.”35 
 
28  No. 05-4599, 2005 WL 2978755, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2005). 
29 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974-75 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
30  66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177 (D. Minn. 2014). 
31 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 22. 
32 Id. at 25. 
33 Id. at 27. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 28. 
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant Seattle Times argued that 
First Amendment freedom of the press should effectively trump the 
protective order.36 The Supreme Court disagreed.37 The Court held that a 
protective order may limit the ways a party can use information obtained 
through discovery without violating the First Amendment.38 The Court 
reasoned that the Seattle Times had no right in the first instance to publish 
the information obtained in the pretrial discovery process.39 The Court 
recognized the danger posed by the dissemination of information obtained in 
discovery, noting that “[t]here is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to 
obtain—incidentally or purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant 
but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.”40 
Seattle Times does not stand for the principle that absent a protective 
order, a receiving party has no obligation to protect the producing party’s 
documents and information. The primary issue on which the case turned was 
whether the First Amendment right to freedom of the press superseded the 
Seattle Times’ discovery obligations and the court-ordered protective order.41 
Even if Seattle Times stood for the proposition that the receiving party has the 
right to publish the information absent a protective order, the case certainly 
does not bestow the right on the receiving party to allow the information it 
receives in discovery to be stolen. Providing no protections whatsoever to the 
information received in discovery leaves sensitive data at risk of theft of 
public dissemination. The Seattle Times Court expressed concerns of the 
dangers posed by dissemination of sensitive information to the public, noting 
the “significant potential for abuse” that “may seriously implicate privacy 
interests of litigants and third parties.”42 The notion that Seattle Times stands 
for the principle that there is no obligation on the receiving party to protect 
this information in the absence of a protective order ignores the express 
concerns highlighted by the Supreme Court in its opinion. Thus, Seattle Times 
cannot be understood to support this notion. 
Discovery is rarely filed in public court.43 In Seattle Times, the newspaper 
received the donor list—purely private information—legally through the 
 
36 Id. at 30-31. 
37 Id. at 36. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 33. 
40 Id. at 35. 
41 Id. at 32. 
42 Id. at 34-35. 
43 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 15 (1983) (“The fruits of discovery are often not filed in court, and, even when they are, the public 
may not have access to them.”). The issues in this paper do not infringe the right to public trials and 
do not reach the question of precautions that should (or should not) be taken at the time of trial. 
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judicial process.44 By its nature, pretrial discovery is an intrusion into a party’s 
private information.45 The Court noted that “[i]t does not necessarily follow . . . 
that a litigant has an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been 
obtained through pretrial discovery.”46 The Seattle Times could not claim that 
there was a First Amendment violation when they never had an ownership 
interest in this information to begin with. 
Seattle Times established that a protective order that satisfies the “good 
cause” requirement of Rule 26(c) may be issued without offending the First 
Amendment.47 But the court left several key questions unanswered. When 
there is no protective order in place, what duty is owed by the receiving party 
to protect the information of the producing party? Are there any limits on a 
receiving party’s use of information acquired in discovery from the producing 
party? Had the protective order not been granted, would the Seattle Times have 
been free to do whatever it wished with the information obtained in discovery? 
One of the most important lingering questions is whether the producing 
party retains an exclusive ownership interest over the information transferred 
in discovery. The exclusive ownership interest is a prerequisite for a successful 
theory of bailment.48 One may make the reasonable inference from the Seattle 
Times holding that the private information obtained through the discovery 
process does not create an ownership interest in the receiving party. But while 
the court held that a litigant does not have an unrestrained right to 
disseminate information, it made no direct ruling on the ownership rights of 
the producing and receiving parties over the information. 
These questions have been left largely unanswered in the thirty-four years 
since the Seattle Times decision. The importance of determining these answers 
has been amplified in a world increasingly dominated by electronic discovery. 
This Comment will proceed by determining whether the receiving party 
obtains an ownership interest in ESI transferred in discovery. 
II. OWNERSHIP OF ESI DOES NOT TRANSFER IN DISCOVERY 
The production of electronically stored information in discovery does not 
equate to a transfer of ownership over those documents and data. The ownership 
of the ESI is retained by the producing party, but a temporary possessory 
 
44 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. 
45  See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access 
to Information Generated through Litigation, 81 CHI. L. REV. 375, 412 (2006) (“Whether or not 
discovery is presumptively private has a critical impact on what it means for a court to issue a 
protective order. If the public has a presumptive right to access discovery materials, a Rule 26(c) 
protective order would restrain not just the parties . . . but also the public.”). 
46 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 31. 
47 Id. at 37. 
48 See supra note 25–26 and accompanying text. 
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interest is transferred to the receiving party during the litigation. If the receiving 
party does not own the data, it is not their data to distribute or to lose. 
A copy of ESI that is produced in discovery has a limited purpose and is 
not for indefinite retention. In discovery, information is not transferred 
willingly—but on a legal obligation.49 The receiving party’s right to use this 
data is not unlimited.50 
The true purpose of the discovery process is to provide parties with the 
information needed to prove their claims and defenses in litigation “to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”51 The Seattle Times Court noted that the newspaper “gained the 
information they wish[ed] to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court’s 
discovery processes. . . . A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to 
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.”52 The 
dissemination of confidential information serves no purpose in litigation.53 
Litigation is not indefinite, and neither are the possessory rights of the 
receiving party over the producing party’s information. The majority of 
courts hold that the information transferred in discovery is not for public 
access.54 Rather, the presumption is that the receiving party may use the 
information obtained through the discovery process solely for use in litigation. 
To obtain the information, the requesting party must first establish that the 
documents are relevant—that they will assist the parties and the trier of facts 
to resolve a disputed question of fact.55 
When considering whether receiving parties obtain an ownership interest 
in discovery materials, it is instructive to consider the Canadian approach to 
 
49 Parties are legally obligated to produce documents and data during the discovery phase of 
litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”). 
50 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 31 (“It does not necessarily follow . . . that a litigant has an 
unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery.”). 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
52 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. 
53 See Rendall, supra note 9, at 770 n.25 (“[D]iscovery is principally a litigation tool, not a 
mechanism for forced publication of confidential information. Dissemination of discovery 
information does not make litigation more efficient, or aid in preparation for trial.”) 
54 See, e.g., SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that information 
transferred in discovery “do[es] not carry a presumption of public access”); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied 
Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying public access to supporting materials 
attached to discovery motions); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (“We think it 
is clear and hold that there is no right of public access to documents considered in discovery motions.”). 
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIV. PROC., NOTES 
TO 2015 AMENDMENT OF FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“A party claiming that a request is important 
to resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears 
on the issues as that party understands them.”). 
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discovery of the “implied undertaking.”56 The implied undertaking principle 
prevents litigants from using information obtained in the discovery process 
for purposes unrelated to the current matter.57 The implied undertaking binds 
all parties and counsel in a case.58 
In a criminal investigation involving child abuse, the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Juman v. Doucette held that the implied undertaking prevented the 
Attorney General of British Columbia from obtaining discovery transcripts 
used in a prior civil action against the same defendant.59 The Canadian 
Supreme Court provided two rationales for this decision. The first rationale 
mirrors the concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Seattle 
Times, namely that discovery is an invasion into a litigant’s privacy:60 
 
The public interest in getting at the truth in a civil action outweighs the 
examinee’s privacy interest, but the latter is nevertheless entitled to a 
measure of protection. The answers and documents are compelled by statute 
solely for the purpose of the civil action and the law thus requires that the 
invasion of privacy should generally be limited to the level of disclosure 
necessary to satisfy that purpose and that purpose alone. . . . The general 
idea, metaphorically speaking, is that whatever is disclosed in the discovery room 
stays in the discovery room unless eventually revealed in the courtroom or 
disclosed by judicial order.61 
 
 The second rationale posed by the Canadian Supreme Court was that, 
absent an understanding that their information would be protected by the 
implied undertaking, litigants would not have an incentive to “provide a more 
complete and candid discovery.”62 
Canada’s implied undertaking approach provides a solution to the problem 
discussed in this Comment. There is a baseline duty of protection under 
Canadian law that has not been expressly articulated under American law.63 
 
56 Craig Gillespie, The Implied Undertaking in Discovery 1 (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.bottomlineresearch.ca/pdf/The%20Implied%20Undertaking%20in%20Discovery.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93PG-F2JL]. 
57 See id. (noting that the implied undertaking principle prohibits litigants from “us[ing] 
information obtained during the discovery process for purposes unrelated to the proceeding”). 
58 Id. 
59 Juman v. Doucette, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157, ¶ 51 (Can.). 
60 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984). 
61 Doucette, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157 at ¶ 25 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at ¶ 26. 
63 Some litigants have taken advantage of the absence of an implied undertaking in the United 
States. See, e.g., Barry Leon & Cynthia Tape, Managing Cross-Border Pharmaceutical Class Actions in 
Canada, 15 ANDREWS CORP. CORRUPTION LITIG. REP., July 26, 2004, at *2 (explaining that cross-
border pharmaceutical class actions involving the United States and Canada are almost always 
brought in the U.S., largely because of the absence of an implied undertaking obligation). 
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The rationales highlighted by the Canadian Supreme Court, however, are just 
as valid under U.S. common law and U.S. jurisprudence. The same privacy 
invasions are at stake from public dissemination of private information. And 
when a protective order is not in place, a producing party is, at minimum, 
disincentived from making a complete and candid discovery.64 
The Canadian implied undertaking approach is founded on the fact that 
a producing party maintains its ownership rights of private information 
contained in discovery materials.65 The receiving party obtains a temporary 
possessory interest in that information for use in litigation. The common 
understanding in Canada is that property rights over information transferred 
in discovery are maintained by the producing party. By observing standard 
protective and confidential order provisions, it is apparent that while there is 
no present legal baseline, the same understanding of the ownership interests 
at stake exists in American law. 
Protective orders have become increasingly common, but no standard 
form exists.66 Yet nearly all protective orders include provisions that require 
the nondisclosure and destruction of data after litigation.67 In a boilerplate 
confidentiality agreement,68 confidential information may be defined as “any 
information that a party believes in good faith to be confidential or sensitive 
information, including, but not limited to, trade secrets, research, design, 
development, financial, technical, marketing, planning, personal, or 
commercial information, as such terms are used in Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .”69 Parties often add provisions 
expanding their definition of confidential information to expand the scope of 
the confidentiality agreement. Parties may designate some information as 
highly confidential, subject to greater protections.70 
 
64 See generally infra Part V (arguing that the production of sensitive data absent a protective 
order may amount to negligence on the part of counsel). 
65 Kandace Terris, Discovery and the Formulation of the Implied Undertaking Rule in Nova Scotia, 22 
NOVA SCOTIA L. NEWS 137, 144 (1996) http://www.lians.ca/sites/default/files/documents/Discovery 
AndTheFormulation.pdf (noting that the implied undertaking rule “is based on recognition of 
the general right of privacy of a person respecting his or her documents. Intrusion resulting from 
discovery should not be allowed for any purpose other than that of securing justice in the 
proceeding in which the discovery takes place”). 
66 William Lynch Schaller, Protecting Trade Secrets During Litigation: Policies and Procedures, 88 
ILL. B.J. 260, 262 (2000). 
67 Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 2181, 2189 (2014) (describing confidentiality agreements and protective orders that 
“often include ‘return-or-destroy’ provisions that require the parties to return or destroy all 
discovery information in the case within a few months of settlement”). 
68 Note that a confidentiality agreement is a private agreement between parties. A protective 
order, by contrast, is an order of the court that supersedes private confidentiality agreements. 
69 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
70 Id. at 41. 
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A standard protective or confidentiality order provision may appear as follows: 
The recipient of any Confidential Material or Highly Confidential Material 
that is provided under this Protective Order shall maintain such information 
in a reasonably secure and safe manner that ensures that access is limited to the 
persons authorized under this Order, and shall further exercise the same 
standard of due and proper care with respect to the storage, custody, use, 
and/or dissemination of such information as is exercised by the recipient with 
respect to its own proprietary information.71 
Orders typically include provisions detailing what the receiving party 
must do in an instance of a data breach, including how quickly the receiving 
party must notify the producing party of the breach.72 Most importantly, the 
order generally includes provisions requiring the destruction or return of 
confidential information.73 
While there is no federal rule mandating the inclusion of these provisions, 
the practice of including these provisions in protective or confidentiality 
orders has become an industry custom.74 The practice is based on an 
underlying understanding among litigants that there is an assumption of 
confidentiality covering the data that is produced.75 If a receiving party truly 
understood the transfer of information in discovery to confer an ownership 
interest in the information received, the receiving party would not agree to 
incur the burden of reasonably protecting that data. Even absent a formal 
rule, such provisions are so commonplace in protective and confidentiality 
orders that there is arguably an implied agreement to return or destroy the 
data after litigation.76 
The producing party cannot be said to lose its ownership interest in the 
ESI that is produced when transferring data to comply with discovery 
obligations. But let’s assume that the opposite is true, and that an ownership 
interest is transferred when data is produced in discovery. The receiving party 
now has a property interest over the ESI it has received. Would it now be 
permissible for the receiving party to add all the email addresses obtained 
from an opponent during discovery to a marketing database? If the receiving 
 
71 Id. at 46. 
72 Id. at 54. 
73 See id. at 54-55 (stating that after the end of litigation, each party “must either return all 
Confidential . . . Information to the Disclosing Party or destroy such material, including all [forms] 
in which the Confidential Information may have been reproduced”). 
74 See Marcus, supra note at 43, at 9 (“These stipulated orders, which usually provide ‘umbrella’ 
protection for all materials designated confidential by the party producing them, have become the 
norm in many areas of federal practice.”). 
75 See id. at 11 (“The assumption of confidentiality carries over into the conduct of the discovery 
process. Far from being open to the public, discovery actually occurs in private.”). 
76 Id. at 10-11. 
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party truly has a property right in the ESI, and there is no implied agreement 
of nondisclosure in discovery, the receiving party could rightfully sell the list 
of email addresses to the highest bidder. 
It is not just electronic documentary evidence that is transferred in 
discovery. Physical evidence is also transferred. Thus, the receiving party 
would not only gain a property right in the ESI; the receiving party would 
now become a partial owner of the physical evidence it receives. It does not 
require an in-depth analysis to explain why this is a ludicrous result. And yet 
the hypothetical could create even more problematic scenarios. 
Consider the effect that the transfer of ownership interests would have on 
intellectual property rights. Could a receiving party now sue a party that has 
published a copyrighted work that had been produced in litigation? Copyright 
law has a particularly low threshold: only a “modicum of creativity” and 
originality is required to receive copyright protection.77 Under the low 
threshold of copyright, almost all written works are copyrightable. If 
intellectual property rights also transfer with discovery, ownership of the 
copyright protections would extend to the receiving party. Along with the 
producing party, the receiving party would now share the right to reproduce, 
adapt, and distribute the copyrighted material.78 A receiving party could now 
rightfully sue anyone who infringes on this copyright. 
The illogical results of this hypothetical illustrate why a property right 
cannot possibly be transferred during the production of information and 
evidence in discovery. As a matter of common sense, no one believes that 
when things of major value are transferred in litigation (drug formulas, trade 
secrets, patents, or artistic works), the intellectual property rights are 
transferred to the receiving party. Logic dictates that it is true not only of 
high-value documents, but of all documents. 
The producing party must maintain a property right over the transferred 
ESI. If a producing party merely transfers a temporary possessory interest 
over its property to a receiving party for the course of litigation, and the 
receiving party truly gains no ownership interest in the property, then the 
discovery process is primed for a bailment analysis. 
In theory, a bailment is created every time there is a separation of 
ownership and possession of a good.79 A bailment may be created by explicit 
agreement, finding, or implication.80 The true owner of the property is known 
 
77 Feist Publn’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (summarizing the exclusive rights held by copyright owners). 
79 R. H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard 
of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 97 (1992). 
80 Id. at 98. 
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as the “bailor.”81 The possessory holder of the property is known as the 
“bailee.”82 A bailment exists when there is 1) delivery, 2) acceptance, and 3) 
consideration of property.83 Depending on the circumstances of the transfer 
of property, the bailee owes a certain level of care to protect the property of 
the bailee.84 In discovery, the receiving party is the bailee and the producing 
party is the bailor. If the elements for a bailment are met in discovery, as I 
will analyze in Part IV, the bailee is under a legal obligation to care for the 
property of the bailor. 
Three standards guide the world of bailment: extraordinary care, ordinary 
care, or gross negligence.85 A breach of bailment action may either be founded 
in tort law or contract law where an explicit agreement to create a bailment 
exists.86 A bailment action brought under tort law holds a bailee liable for losses 
resulting from the bailee’s failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care.87 
These standards of care and when they apply will be explored in more detail in 
Part V. But first, this Comment will discuss the historical roadblocks that 
bailment theories have faced when introduced in past data breach litigation. 
III. DATA SECURITY LITIGATION AND BAILMENT 
Several courts have addressed the theory of bailment in the context of 
data breach litigation but have declined to extend bailment liability to 
electronic data that is lost or stolen. No court to date has fully developed the 
analysis.88 No court has ever addressed the theory of bailment directly in the 
context of discovery obligations. 
 
81 See generally Mark S. Dennis, Bailee’s Liability for Damage, Loss, or Theft of Bailed Property, 46 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 361 § 2 (2018).  
82 See generally id. 
83 See Charles E. Cullen, The Definition of Bailment, 11 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 257, 259-62 (1926) 
(discussing components that are commonly present in bailment transactions). 
84 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. 
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 127 n.2 (8th ed. 2014) (explaining that the 
question of what obligations a bailee owes varies, where “some bailees were held to a standard of 
great care, some (such as finders) to a standard of minimal care, and the balance to an ordinary 
negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. The modern view is that the latter 
standard should apply across the board”); Helmholz, supra note 79, at 99, 102 (noting that “the 
accepted view holds that a uniform standard of ordinary care prevails” but that “[b]ailees are 
frequently held to a higher standard of care”). 
85 See Dennis, supra note 81, § 19. 
86 Rachel M. Kane, Proof of Breach of Bailment in Cases Where Object of Bailment is in Form of 
Electronic Data, 156 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 § 2 (2016) (“An action for breach of bailment 
may sound in either tort or contract, at the plaintiff ’s option.”). 
87 See DW Data, Inc. v. C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (applying Illinois state law, and finding that “[b]ailees will be liable for losses that result from 
their . . . failure to exercise [ordinary care]”). 
88 See Todd Ommen, Bailment Claims: A Cause of Action in Data Breach Cases, WEITZ & 
LUXENBERG (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.weitzlux.com/blog/2015/04/14/bailment-claims-cause-
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The consensus of courts in data security litigation has been that electronic 
data that is transferred does not constitute the “delivery” of property required 
for the creation of a bailment. The bailment theory to data breach was first 
addressed in Richardson v. DSW, Inc.89 In Richardson, a class of consumer 
plaintiffs sued DSW under a bailment theory after a data security breach lead 
to the dissemination of stolen credit and debit card information.90 The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ bailment theory.91 
The Northern District of Illinois defined a bailment as “the delivery of 
property for some purpose upon a contract, express or implied, that after the 
purpose has been fulfilled, the property shall be redelivered to the bailor.”92 
The Richardson court noted that intangible property, such as electronic data, 
may be the subject of a bailment in certain circumstances, but a successful 
bailment claim must include the delivery and return of the property.93 
Ultimately, because there was no agreement that DSW would return her credit 
card information to her, the plaintiff ’s bailment theory could not succeed.94 
The bailment theory to data security litigation first introduced in 
Richardson later resurfaced in Sony Gaming Networks and Target. Sony Gaming 
Networks involved a nationwide class action brought against Sony following a 
massive data breach.95 Hackers accessed Sony’s network and stole the 
personal information of millions of Sony customers, including customers’ 
“names, mailing addresses, email addresses, birth dates, credit and debit card 
information,” and more.96 
The class alleged a variety of claims, including a claim for breach under a 
theory of bailment.97 The Sony court quickly dismissed the bailment claim, 
reasoning that the plaintiff ’s electronic personal information could not be 
“construed to be personal property so that the [p]laintiffs somehow ‘delivered’ 
this property to Sony and then expected it to be returned.”98 
The issue was addressed again in Target following a massive data breach 
of Target’s retail stores.99 Hackers successfully breached Target’s data security 
 
action-data-breach-cases/ [https://perma.cc/5F7T-UUXD] (“Bailment is a long-standing, well-
developed, and relevant cause of action that deserves better analysis and evaluation in data breach 
cases than it has received from courts to date.”). 
89 No. 05-4599, 2005 WL 2978755 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2005). 
90 Id. at *1. 
91 Id. at *4. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 
(S.D. Cal. 2012). 
96 Id. at 950. 
97 Id. at 974. 
98 Id. 
99 In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157 (D. Minn. 2014). 
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systems and stole the personal information and credit and debit card 
information of approximately 110 million customers of Target.100 Once again, 
the class of plaintiffs alleged a bailment theory for injuries suffered from 
Target’s failure to adequately protect their electronic information.101 
Citing both Richardson and Sony Gaming Networks, the Target court 
rejected the plaintiff ’s bailment claims, reasoning that the electronic data that 
was stolen could not be returned to the bailor.102 However, the Target Court 
“provided essentially no analysis of bailment claims, the standard of care 
applicable, or the issue of whether ‘return’ of the property is an element at 
all, let alone where the property is intangible.”103 
The consideration of bailment liability in cases of data breach has been 
underdeveloped and overlooked. The courts here engaged in the wrong 
analysis of the issue of “return.” The analysis should not focus on whether the 
property be physically returned, but should instead focus on the temporary 
nature of the baliee’s possessory interest. Companies like Target and Sony are 
not permitted to retain customer credit card and personal information 
indefinitely. The companies receive a digital copy of the information, but they 
certainly do not obtain an ownership interest over an individual’s credit card 
or personal data. In some cases, these companies are required by law to 
destroy the credit card and personal data after a certain period.104 Moreover, 
by destroying the data, they return to the customer the right (or fact) that 
they are the sole possessor of the personal data and information in question. 
Customers and these companies have an implied agreement to destroy the 
data copies following the purchase transaction. Industry standards and 
legislation often expressly prohibit the retaining of certain credit card and 
customer data. In Target, for example, the consumer plaintiffs cited Minnesota 
law preventing companies from retaining credit card security code data or PIN 
verification data from more than forty-eight hours after the transaction has 
been authorized.105 A company that fails to delete the data within forty-eight 
hours of authorization is in violation of the statutory time limitation.106 
The credit card industry itself has established guidelines requiring the 
deletion of certain data. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1177. 
102 See id. (“Even if Plaintiffs are correct that intangible property such as their personal 
financial information can constitute property subject to bailment principles, they have not—and 
cannot—allege that they and Target agreed that Target would return the property to them.”). 
103 Ommen, supra note 88. 
104 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.64 (West 2007) (providing for liability for an entity 
engaged in business in Minnesota that retains security code data, a PIN verification code number, 
or the contents of magnetic stripe data collected in connection with a transaction). 
105 Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1168. 
106 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.64 (West 2007). 
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direct companies to retain consumer data no longer than necessary for 
business, legal, or regulatory purposes and to regularly purge unnecessarily 
stored data.107 The Standards also direct companies to purge consumer 
authentication data after the transaction is authorized.108 Ultimately, 
companies like Sony and Target are under an obligation to destroy customers’ 
sensitive data after the authorization of the transaction. 
A look into the plaintiffs’ complaint and brief in Target is instructive. The 
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that “Target failed to return, purge or 
delete the personal and financial information of Plaintiffs and members of 
the Class at the conclusion of the bailment (or deposit) and within the time 
limits allowed by law.”109 The plaintiffs further alleged that there was an 
implied agreement for Target to comply with industry and legal standards.110 
As a result of the breach, plaintiffs alleged their financial and personal 
information was “damaged and its value diminished.”111 
The courts in these data breach litigations failed to recognize that when 
there is an obligation on the company to delete the data, there is a viable 
argument for bailment liability. The issue is not merely whether the data was 
returned, but whether the data was dealt with according to the directions of 
the bailor.112 Despite the courts’ holdings in these consumer breach cases, the 
plaintiffs’ bailment theories did not depend on the literal return of the data. 
While the consumers gave no explicit instructions to the companies 
receiving their data, there was a legal obligation on the company to delete the 
data and a credible implicit expectation that the company adequately 
safeguard customers’ data and comply with the law. The companies did not 
deal with the consumers’ intangible property according to their implied and 
legal obligations, arguably satisfying the bailment requirement that the data 
was never returned, or was returned in a damaged form. The personal data of 
the consumers was irreparably damaged by the data breach. As a result, the 
claims as pleaded by the consumer plaintiffs in Sony Gaming Networks, Target, 
and Richardson, gave rise to a plausible theory of bailment liability. 
 
107 PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY SECURITY STANDARDS, COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD 
INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY STANDARDS 14 (2010). 
108 See id. (noting that companies should not “store sensitive authentication data after authorization”). 
109 Consumer Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 118, In re 
Target, 2014 WL 7014791 (No. 14-2522).  
110 Consumer Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 58-
60, In re Target, 2014 WL 7014791 (No. 14-2522).  
111 Consumer Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 118, In re 
Target, 2014 WL 7014791 (No. 14-2522).  
112 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Home Indem. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 
166 S.E.2d 819, 824 (S.C. 1969) (noting that after the terms of the bailment contract have been fulfilled, 
the chattel “shall be redelivered to the bailor, or otherwise dealt with according to his directions”). 
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Regardless of whether the courts engaged in the correct bailment analysis, 
the rejection of the bailment theories in the data breach context does not 
preclude the exploration of bailment principles in the discovery process. The 
context of discovery differs from traditional data breach litigation in ways 
that make the application of bailment theory more feasible. First, as made 
clear in Seattle Times, the receiving party’s rights to the data are limited and 
only for a limited purpose. Second, the production of the data is not voluntary 
and compels the production of information that the requesting party would 
not be entitled to otherwise. Third, the general presumption is that the 
receiving party will not keep the information that is produced. Part V will 
explore why the transfer of electronic data in discovery meets all the elements 
required for the application of bailment liability. 
IV. THE MODERN DEFINITION OF BAILMENT INCLUDES ESI 
Before applying the legal standards of bailment to the discovery context, 
I must establish that electronic information transferred through the discovery 
process is property that may be subject to bailment liability. 
A bailment only applies to certain types of property.113 Historically, 
bailment law only applied to tangible property such as chattels.114 Whether 
bailment applies to intangible property, such as electronic data, has long been 
a matter of substantial debate.115 For example, the Northern District of 
California previously concluded that social security numbers and credit card 
information are not bailable property.116 
It is well established that “information” may be the subject of a 
bailment.117 For example, a court has found information contained in a letter 
is property subject to be bailed.118 Similarly, scholars have argued that 
information contained in an email is property under bailment theory.119 
Therefore, information in itself may be bailable property. 
 
113 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 3 (2018) (overviewing the types of property that may be 
subject to bailment). 
114 See, e.g., Samuel Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 5, 31-32 (1957) 
(discussing a late eighteenth-century bailment case that involved tangible property). 
115 See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1275-77 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2007) (analyzing whether traditional torts should apply to intangible data). 
116 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (applying California law 
to find that a social security number could not be personal property under bailment theory), aff ’d, 
380 F. App’x. 689 (9th Cir. 2010). 
117 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 3 n.1 (2018). 
118 Liddle v. Salem Sch. Dist., 619 N.E.2d 530, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
119 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails: Inheritable 
Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 306 (2007) (noting 
that “[e]ven the intangible information contained in an email may be bailed”). But see Rachel M. 
Kane, Proof of Breach of Bailment in Cases Where Object of Bailment Is in Form of Electronic Data, 156 
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Courts have repeatedly held that electronic data may be intangible 
property subject to a bailment. Courts have interpreted bailments of 
electronic data to include computerized data stored on a hard drive,120 
information stored electronically on a computer,121 computer programs,122 and 
financial data stored on a computer.123 
Notably, the information transferred in discovery is not the original data, 
but rather is a copy of the data. Therefore, the ESI is simultaneously in the 
possession of both the producing and the receiving party. This runs afoul of 
traditional bailment principles requiring that the bailor take exclusive 
possession of the property.124 The exclusivity requirement is designed to 
prevent the creation of bailments where the bailee maintains control over the 
property, particularly in cases of shared possession.125 
The exclusivity requirement, however, should not be applied to bailments 
of intangible property. Intangible property is easily copied and disseminated, 
and thus is almost never in the exclusive possession of the bailee. Although 
both the producing and receiving party possess the information, the transfer 
of ESI in discovery cannot be conceptualized as a shared possession. By 
producing a copy of ESI to a receiving party, the producing party is 
relinquishing control over that data. They are placing that ESI in the care of 
the receiving party to be stored at greater risk of data security threats.126 This 
temporary “storage” transaction is not the type of bailment that the 
exclusivity requirement seeks to prevent but rather is precisely the type of 
property exchange that gives rise to a bailment.127 Furthermore, recent case 
law has suggested that the exclusivity requirement should no longer be 
applied to electronic data.128 
Even if the ESI transferred in discovery is at odds with the bailment 
exclusivity requirement, an electronic copy of the data may be easily 
 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 § 11 (2016) (illustrating circumstances where a bailment obligation 
is not breached by a recipient of electronically conveyed images if the recipient complies with the 
sender’s instructions for deletion, notwithstanding the subsequent dissemination of the data). 
120 Bridge Tower Dental, P.A. v. Meridian Comput. Ctr., Inc., 272 P.3d 541, 546 (Idaho 2012). 
121 Shmueli v. Corcoran Grp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 877-78 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
122 David Barr Realtors, Inc. v. Sadei, No. 03-97-00138, 1998 WL 333954, at *3 (Tex. App. 
June 25, 1998). 
123 See id. at *3, 8. 
124 See, e.g., Beech Transp. v. Critical Care Servs., No. 01-0292, 2001 Minn. App. Lexis 1129, at 
*9 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001) (concluding that there was no bailment where the bailor did not 
have exclusive possession, control, and dominion over the property). 
125 See also Herrington v. Verrilli, 151 F. Supp. 2d 449, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (differentiating 
“non-bailment ‘park and lock’” situations from bailment). 
126 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
127 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 5 n.7 (2018) (citing example of the storage of goods in 
a warehouse). 
128 See supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text. 
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construed as entirely new property. Under this conception, the copy of the 
ESI is in the sole possession of the receiving party for whom the copy was 
made, and thus the exclusivity requirement would be satisfied. 
In either case, the definition of intangible personal property for bailment 
purposes must include copies of electronic data. Intangible, electronically 
stored information that is copied and transferred to the receiving party may 
be held in bailment if this transfer meets the required elements for the 
creation of a bailment. 
 
V. APPLICATION OF BAILMENT ELEMENTS TO THE DISCOVERY 
PROCESS 
A bailment only arises when certain essential elements are met.129 The 
transfer of information through the discovery process satisfies the 
prerequisite elements for the creation of a bailment. As previously 
mentioned, a bailment exists when there is 1) delivery, 2) acceptance, and 3) 
consideration of property.130 First, a bailment must involve the delivery of 
possession or control over property from the bailor to the bailee, as well as 
the return of the property in an undamaged condition.131 Second, there must 
be an agreement by the bailee, either explicit or implied, to accept possession 
or control over the property.132 Third, a bailment may only exist when there 
is an exchange of something of value.133 Electronic data in discovery may be 
evaluated under bailment theory as it is produced and delivered to a receiving 
party who accepts the data and receives the benefit of information relevant to 
their claims and defenses in litigation. 
The consideration element is satisfied and may be disposed of without 
discussion. For consideration to be satisfied, there must be a transfer of 
something of value. The purpose of discovery is to obtain the information 
necessary for a party to prove their claims and defenses. Information that is 
relevant to a party’s claims and defenses has innate value in litigation. As a 
result, the “consideration” element is satisfied. My analysis will focus on the 
delivery and acceptance elements. 
 
129 See supra note 25. 
130 See also William King Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, 16 CORNELL L. REV. 286, 289-91 
(1931) (applying bailment requirements to a particular set of facts). 
131 See supra note 25 § 1 (“Inherent in the bailment relationship is the requirement that the 
property be returned to the bailer, or duly accounted for by the bailee, when the purpose of the 
bailment is accomplished.”). 
132 See id. (“A bailment is created . . . pursuant to an express or implied contract to fulfill that trust.”). 
133 See id. (“A bailment relationship can be implied by law whenever the personal property of 
one person is acquired by another . . . .”). 
 
2019] New Legal Problems, Old Legal Solutions 795 
A. Delivery and Return of the ESI 
The production and transfer of electronic data in discovery constitutes a 
delivery of goods and creates a duty in the bailee to return the goods when the 
bailment ends. Some scholars argue that the transmission of electronic 
information does not constitute a delivery, and thus can never be a bailment.134 
This was the ultimate failing of the bailment theories in the data security 
litigation covered in Part IV. The shortcomings that existed in Richardson, Target, 
and Sony Gaming Networks, however, do not apply to the discovery process. 
There must be a change in possession of the property to impute a 
bailment. The “delivery” and “return” of intangible property is precisely what 
happens in discovery. Parties in litigation issue requests for production to 
obtain information in the possession of their opponent in hopes of using that 
information to meet the elements of their claim or defense.135 Recall that in 
Part II, I established that a receiving party gains no ownership interest in the 
information obtained from their adversary.136 Just as in a bailment, the 
receiving party obtains possession of the relevant information from the 
producing party, but does not gain an ownership interest in the information. 
A temporary possessory interest is created. At no point does the producing 
party lose title to the information that is transferred. The receiving party is 
merely “warehousing” the ESI for use during litigation.137 The production of 
ESI is equivalent to the delivery of bailed property. 
A bailee “is under a strict duty to return the bailed goods at the expiration 
of the term of bailment.”138 If bailed property is not returned to the bailor, it 
must at least be disposed of according to the bailor’s directions.139 In 
discovery, must a receiving party return the electronic data to the producing 
party at the end of discovery? Seattle Times dealt with this issue: Could the 
 
134 See Lim, supra note 17, at 94-95 (“[D]ata security does not actually involve the delivery of 
property or information. . . . [W]hen data is secured electronically . . . there is no change in 
possession and so it is hard to see how simply securing information could constitute a bailment.”). 
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (“A party may serve on another party a request . . . to 
produce . . . any designated documents or electronically stored information . . . .”). 
136 See supra Part II. 
137 Warehousing refers to the business of paying for the storage of goods. HOWARD J. ALPERIN, 
14 MASS. PRAC., SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 2:15 (5th ed. 2017); see, e.g., Carr v. Hoosier Photo 
Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450, 452-53 (Ind. 1982) (discussing rolls of photographic film lost by a film 
developer); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Wash. 1979) (discussing destruction of reels 
of movie film). Warehousing provides a clear example of an explicit agreement, usually under contract, 
to enter a bailment to store goods temporarily and for the warehouse to protect those goods from harm. 
138 Walton Commercial Enters., Inc. v. Ass’ns, Conventions, Tradeshows, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 64, 
67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
139 See Home Indem. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 452, 460 (1969) (“[A]fter the 
purpose [of the bailment] has been fulfilled, then the chattel shall be redelivered to the bailor, or 
otherwise dealt with according to his directions.”). 
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newspaper have published the information it received during discovery, or 
was it under some obligation to “return” or destroy the data it received? 
The answer turns on whether information transferred in discovery is truly 
private such that it must be returned to the producing party. Private 
information that is publicly disclosed cannot be said to be “returned” for the 
purposes of a bailment. The Seattle Times Court noted that some discovery 
information may be publicized. Information that would traditionally be 
public may be disseminated.140 Purely private information transferred in 
discovery, however, may not be disseminated; said differently, “[a] litigant has 
no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for 
purposes of trying his suit.”141 
The Supreme Court has held that discovery in civil litigation is not part 
of the open civil process, but rather is a private affair.142 Some scholars have 
argued that although the “Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that 
privacy interests are protected by Rule 26(c) . . . that does not mean that this 
protection applies in all commercial cases.”143 This suggests that there is no 
blanket rule protecting the confidentiality of information transferred in 
discovery without a protective or confidentiality order in place. This 
assertion, however, ignores the temporary nature of the discovery process. 
The process of obtaining discovery ends at a time set by the court, but the 
true end of discovery is the termination of the litigation. 
Litigation never goes on forever. After a lawsuit, all confidential 
information disclosed during discovery generally must be returned to the 
producing party.144 The receiving party’s limited right to use and keep the 
information has ended. Some critics of protective orders have argued that all 
information disclosed in discovery should be public.145 While there are some 
circumstances in which information may not be returned to the producing 
party, the baseline presumption is that at the end of litigation the receiving 
party must either return the ESI or destroy it according to the producing 
 
140 Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (“[P]retrial depositions and 
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. . . . [R]estraints placed on discovered, but 
not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.”). 
141 Id. at 32. 
142 See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Scalia, J.) (“Traditionally, absent a statute or court order, even parties to the case did not have the 
right to inspect depositions taken at the behest of their opponents.”). 
143 Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 492 (1991). 
144 This understanding is supported by provisions in the model federal protective order provided by 
the Sedona Conference, see THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 54-55 (“Upon final resolution 
of this Litigation the Parties will certify that all Confidential Material and/or Highly Confidential Material 
has been returned to the Producing Party and/or been destroyed in a secure manner.”). 
145 For a full analysis of the arguments of these critics, see Marcus, supra note 143, at 459-66. 
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party’s instructions.146 When the information involved is confidential, the 
return or destruction of the ESI is a certainty because a protective or 
confidentiality order will nearly always be issued.147 It is arguably malpractice 
for an attorney to not ensure that the confidential information of their client 
was thoroughly protected. But even absent a discovery order, a receiving 
party gains no ownership interest in the ESI received.148 Because the 
information remains private at the termination of litigation and must be dealt 
with according to the producing parties’ instructions, the data that was 
transferred is effectively “returned” to the producing party. 
B. Agreement and Acceptance of the ESI 
The receiving party may be presumed to have accepted the electronic 
information. It is unlikely that any party ever declines to receive the 
information sent by the producing party in discovery because they hope that 
the information obtained will help them prove their claims or defenses. In 
fact, much of the information transferred in discovery would be specifically 
requested by the receiving party. 
In federal court, parties are obligated to disclose certain information 
through initial disclosures.149 The remaining data produced is either sent 
willingly in response to requests for production,150 or unwillingly pursuant to 
a court order or subpoena.151 
Although a party actually accepts the information transferred in discovery, 
is there an explicit or implied agreement to accept the information? The 
transfer of ESI in discovery can be construed as either an explicit or an 
implied agreement. A request for production may be understood as an 
explicit agreement to accept the information because the ESI that is 
transferred has been requested by the receiving party. 
Even absent a direct request for production, the transfer of ESI in 
discovery may constitute an implied agreement. It is well settled that “[a] 
bailment relationship can be implied by law whenever the personal property 
of one person is acquired by another and held under circumstances in which 
principles of justice require the recipient to keep the property safely and 
 
146 Supra note 144. 
147 See Marcus, supra note 43, at 10-11 (summarizing procedures for ensuring the privacy of 
confidential information during and after the conclusion of litigation). 
148 See supra Part II. 
149 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (listing numerous documents and pieces of information that 
“a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties”). 
150 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (describing what information and documentation parties 
can request from each other and procedures for doing so). 
151 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (detailing when a party may seek court-ordered compulsion 
of production of discoverable materials). 
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return it to the owner.”152 This is precisely what happens in discovery. The 
discovery process involves the transfer of intangible property, or ESI, 
belonging to the producing party to the receiving party. The receiving party 
then proceeds to hold this ESI over the course of litigation and ultimately 
returns the ESI to the possession of the producing party after the conclusion 
of the litigation. 
This Comment seeks to establish that ESI obtained in discovery is “held 
under circumstances in which principles of justice require the recipient to 
keep the property safely.”153 In the context of ESI, keeping the property safe 
means establishing adequate safety measures to protect the data from data 
security threats and hacking. This baseline obligation to keep the property 
safe does not currently exist. Protective and confidentiality orders fill this gap 
in the law. They serve as explicit agreements to ensure that ESI is kept safe. 
But even in the absence of a protective order, there is an existing implied 
agreement to keep the property of the producing party safe. This can be 
better understood by a comparative analysis considering the obligations that 
are placed on a producing party in discovery. Producing parties are 
responsible for preserving relevant electronically stored information for 
discovery.154 A producing party that fails to take reasonable steps to preserve 
relevant data to a reasonably anticipated litigation may be subject to 
sanctions.155 In other words, a producing party that loses data that is in its 
possession, custody, and control can be subject to fines, cost shifting, special 
jury instructions, and, in extreme cases, case-altering sanctions such as an 
adverse inference.156 When it comes to protecting and preserving ESI, 
producing parties are held to a high standard. 
However, there is no precedent for issuing sanctions against a receiving 
party who fails to adequately protect the property of the producing party 
when a protective order is not in place, even though companies invest massive 
amounts of money in their information technology infrastructure to protect 
 
152 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 1 (2018). 
153 Id. 
154 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A party or 
anticipated party must retain all relevant documents . . . in existence at the time the duty to preserve 
attaches, and any relevant documents created thereafter . . . . [T]here are many ways to manage 
electronic data, [so] litigants are free to choose how this task is accomplished.”). 
155 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that courts have “[t]he right to impose sanctions” for failing to preserve relevant evidence, an 
ability that “arises from a court’s inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation”). 
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B) (providing that, where ESI that should have been stored is 
lost due to a party’s failure to take precautionary measures and intent to deprive their opponent of 
the information, the court may issue an adverse inference jury instruction). 
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their own proprietary data.157 With such stringent obligations placed on the 
producing party to protect the ESI, it is highly implausible that the receiving 
party has no obligation whatsoever to protect the data that they receive. 
Consider the following scenario. A large multinational corporation is sued 
in a products liability class action litigation. Suppose the product is a highly 
advanced artificial knee replacement that has recently caused medical 
complications. As soon as the corporation becomes aware of these complications, 
it “reasonably anticipates” litigation and a preservation obligation is triggered.158 
The class then issues lengthy discovery requests seeking massive amounts of 
proprietary, trade secret, and confidential information. 
Suppose, for purposes of this hypothetical, that no protective or 
confidentiality order is executed. The corporation produces millions of pages 
of electronic data in response to the plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Included in 
their production is the highly sensitive schematic of their knee replacement 
device. Soon after, the plaintiff ’s law firm is hacked and hackers upload the 
highly sensitive schematic to the internet. What recourse does the corporation 
have? The corporation may seek recourse outside of the present litigation by 
opting to sue for negligence and failure to take reasonable security precautions. 
However, discovery law itself offers the party no immediate recourse. 
Now suppose an alternate scenario where the plaintiffs request all 
communications relating to the knee replacement device between the time 
that the corporation reasonably anticipated litigation to the present. During 
this time, the corporation was obligated to take reasonable steps to prevent 
the loss of relevant data. But, due to the corporation’s failure to institute an 
effective and reasonable litigation hold, large chunks of relevant 
communications were permanently and irreplaceably deleted as a part of the 
corporation’s IT function that automatically deleted emails after two weeks.159 
Because the corporation failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the data, 
the corporation would be subject to sanctions and other penalties. 
In both scenarios, data was lost or placed at substantial risk. Yet only the 
corporation faces repercussions under discovery law, while the class of plaintiffs 
escapes unscathed. The corporation must turn to tort law for a remedy, and may 
only do so after the data has been irreparably damaged or lost. This imbalance 
has no place in a judicial system that is guided by reason. There must be some 
recourse to protect the producing party under discovery law. 
 
157 See, e.g., Kate Fazzini, Facebook: We’re Investing in Security and it Will Hurt Profits, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 11, 2017, 5:03 PM) (detailing Facebook’s plans to double its cybersecurity staff and expand security 
engineering efforts, even though doing so would take resources away from profit-generating projects). 
158 See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (“[A]nyone who [reasonably] anticipates being a party . . . 
is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action 
[and/or] is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence . . . .”). 
159 This is highly unlikely, but let’s assume this for the purposes of the hypothetical. 
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If there is no recourse under the law, or no agreement that the receiving 
party will keep the data safe, it would be negligent of the producing party and 
its counsel to produce the data in the first place. Without a protective order, 
a party would be handing sensitive data to a third party without any assurance 
that they will protect the data using proper data security measures. Thus, 
without a common-law obligation or recourse in the event of a data breach, it 
would be negligent for counsel for the producing party to turn over ESI in 
discovery in terms of data security.160 This cannot be the answer. 
It can be stated with a reasonable degree of certainty that a receiving party 
has at least some obligation arising out of an explicit or implied agreement to 
protect the data of the opposing party.161 
C. Data Breach and “Damaged” ESI 
The production of electronic data in discovery is primed for the 
application of a bailment analysis. Since it has been established that the 
transfer of data in discovery satisfies the elements of a bailment, we must 
determine whether lost or stolen data held by the receiving party would permit 
a claim of bailment liability. Recall that if a bailment exists, four elements must 
be satisfied to bring a successful bailment claim for electronic data: “1) the 
existence of an agreement, express or implied, to create a bailment; 2) delivery 
of the electronic data; 3) acceptance of the electronic data by the bailee; and 
4) nonreturn or redelivery of the electronic data in a damaged condition.”162 
The first three elements have been established. Thus, a producing party 
may bring a successful claim for bailment liability only if it can demonstrate 
the “nonreturn or redelivery of the electronic data in a damaged condition.”163 
But, may data that is breached through hacking, cyber-attacks, or corporate 
espionage be considered “damaged?” 
 
160 Knowingly placing your client’s electronic data at risk may be both malpractice and a 
violation of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers have a duty to protect client 
information from data breaches. See AM. BAR. ASS’N, FORMAL OPINION 483: LAWYERS’ 
OBLIGATIONS AFTER AN ELECTRONIC DATA BREACH OR CYBERATTACK 7 (2018) (explaining 
that lawyers have an obligation under Model Rule 1.6(c) to take reasonable efforts to prevent the 
inadvertent disclosure or unauthorized access of client’s information, and that “[t]hese reasonable 
efforts could include (i) restoring the technology systems as practical, (ii) the implementation of 
new technology or new systems, or (iii) the use of no technology at all if the task does not require 
it, depending on the circumstances”). 
161 See, e.g., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES (THIRD EDITION): 
BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 178-79 (2018) (“Just as responding parties are obligated to take 
reasonable steps that are proportional to the needs of the case to find and produce requested 
information within the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), a requesting party should take 
reasonable steps to secure the information they requested and received.”). 
162 Kane, supra note 86. 
163 Id. 
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Bridge Tower Dental, P.A., v. Meridian Computer Center, Inc.164 provides an 
example of the damaged condition requirement for bailment liability. The 
defendant in Bridge Tower, a computer service company, owed a duty of 
reasonable care to protect two hard drives delivered by the plaintiff under a 
bailment theory.165 The defendant accidentally deleted the data from one of 
the hard drives and returned the data in a “damaged state.”166 When property 
is delivered in a damaged state or not delivered at all to the bailor, “the law 
presumes negligence to be the cause, and casts upon the bailee the burden of 
showing that the loss is due to other causes consistent with due care on his 
part.”167 The Bridge Tower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff under a bailment 
theory of liability.168 
It is undeniable that the deletion of data from a hard drive constitutes 
damage of property. It is less clear, however, whether a data breach can be 
construed as damaging the electronically stored information. The district court 
in In re Sony dealt with claims that a data breach caused by hacking resulted in 
property damage to the Sony customers whose personal information was 
stolen.169 The court dismissed the property damage tort claims because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege “what property was allegedly damaged, or how the 
alleged property damage was proximately caused by Sony’s breach.”170 
For purposes of bailment liability, property is “damaged” when it is not 
returned in the same condition it was in when it was delivered.171 Data that 
has been hacked has been fundamentally and irreparably changed, and thus is 
not returned in the same condition that it was in when it was delivered. The 
most evident change arises from the decrease in value that results from 
hacking. Consider the hacking of a trade secret. A trade secret is “information 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique or process, that derives independent economic value.”172 Most 
modern trade secrets are maintained in an electronic format. By definition, 
value is stored in the electronic data that makes up a trade secret. When that 
electronic data is breached and accessed by hackers, it suffers a loss of value 
that equates to a damaged condition of the data.173 
 
164 272 P.3d 541 (Idaho 2012). 
165 Id. at 546. 
166 Id. 
167 Cluer v. Leahy, 256 P. 760, 761 (Idaho 1927). 
168 Bridge Tower, 272 P.3d at 542. 
169 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 26, at 950. 
170 In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
964 (S.D. Cal. 2014), order corrected No. 11MD2258, 2014 WL 12603117 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014). 
171 Kane, supra note 86, at § 6. 
172 59 A.L.R. 4th 641 § 3 (1988). 
173 See Brian T. Yeh, Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and Legislation, CONG. 
RES. SERV. 2 (2016) (“U.S. companies annually suffer billions of dollars in losses due to the theft of 
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Recall the scenario posed in Section V.B hypothesizing an artificial knee 
replacement products liability litigation. In that hypothetical, hackers 
breached the plaintiff ’s law firm, obtained highly sensitive trade secret 
information surrounding the development of the corporation’s product, and 
leaked the information on the Internet. The corporation might have spent 
tens of millions of dollars in research and development to create their 
product, only to see the schematic widely disseminated in a singular breach. 
This would result in a massive decrease in the informational value of the trade 
secret. When this information is returned at the end of litigation, it is 
returned in an undeniably damaged condition.174 A data breach can cause 
significant damage to ESI. 
The transfer of ESI in discovery satisfies the prerequisite elements for the 
creation of a bailment and the application of bailment liability. The property 
principle of bailment may therefore supply the framework to set a standard 
in the discovery context. 
VI. THE NEW BASELINE STANDARD 
Now that bailment’s ability to supply the standard of care in discovery has 
been established, I return to the question: when there is no protective order 
in place, what duty is owed by the receiving party to protect the information 
of the producing party? 
The duty of care a bailee must exercise over the property depends on the 
circumstances surrounding the bailment. When there is a contractual 
agreement to enter a bailment, the standard of care established in the contract 
controls.175 In the absence of an agreement, bailments can arise in involuntary 
or implied circumstances.176 Under the traditional conception of bailment 
liability, a bailment may fall into one of three categories: 1) for the benefit of 
both the bailor and bailee, 2) for the sole benefit of the bailor, or 3) for the 
 
their trade secrets by employees, corporate competitors, and even foreign governments. Stealing trade 
secrets has increasingly involved the use of cyberspace, advanced computer technologies, and mobile 
communication devices, thus making the theft relatively anonymous and difficult to detect.”). 
174 Data breaches can also cause companies significant losses in profit. See Elizabeth A. Harris, 
Data Breach Hurts Profit at Target, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/business/target-reports-on-fourth-quarter-earnings.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/S7Q8-YTXG] (“The widespread theft of Target customer data had a significant 
impact on the company’s profit, which fell more than 40 percent in the fourth quarter.”). 
175 See Helmholz, supra note 79, at 110 (noting courts have “determined that ‘it is [the bailee’s] 
contract which must measure the extent of his liability,’ and, if there has been damage, this 
contractual undertaking results in liability without fault”). 
176 Id. at 98. 
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sole benefit of the bailee.177 Each classification traditionally carries its own 
duty of care standard. 
A bailment that both benefits the bailor and bailee is mutually beneficial. 
Mutually beneficial bailments commonly arise in circumstances where the 
bailee is paid to protect the property of the bailor. For example, a hotel that 
stores valuables and bags for its patrons creates a mutually beneficial 
bailment. When the bailment is mutually beneficial, the bailee owes ordinary 
care to protect the property of the bailor.178 
Bailments that only benefit the bailor are often involuntary. For example, 
when someone asks a stranger to “keep an eye on their bag,” a bailment is 
created that is for the sole benefit of the bailor. When a bailment only benefits 
the bailor, the bailee can only be liable for gross negligence in failing to protect 
the property of the bailor.179 In the foregoing example, the bag-monitoring 
stranger would only be liable for gross negligence in failing to keep the bag safe. 
In contrast, an example of a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee 
occurs when an individual lends their car to a friend and receives nothing in 
return. When a bailment only benefits the bailee, the bailee owes 
extraordinary care to protect the property of the bailor.180 In this scenario, the 
friend owes extraordinary care to keep the car safe, as he is receiving the full 
benefit of the property’s use. 
So where does the transfer of ESI in the discovery process fit into the 
bailment standards of care? The transfer of information during discovery can 
only be construed as being mutually beneficial or for the sole benefit of the 
bailee. Therefore, depending on how the bailment is understood, the 
receiving party either owes ordinary care or extraordinary care to protect the 
ESI of the producing party. 
The most logical construction of the discovery process is as a “mutually 
beneficial” bailment. The receiving party has the obvious benefit of obtaining 
information that may be used to prove their claims or defenses. The 
producing party receives a benefit from complying with their discovery 
obligations: producing relevant information protects the producing party 
from adverse court orders and potential sanctions. 
 
177 See James L. Buchwalter & Karl Oakes, 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 14 (2018) (noting that an 
“implied-in-fact bailment depends on the surrounding facts”); see also John T. Handy Co. v. Carman, 
648 A.2d 1115, 1122 (Md. Sp. App. 1994) (recognizing the validity of an implied bailment). 
178 See Kurt Philip Autor, Bailment Liability: Toward A Standard of Reasonable Care, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 2117, 2131 (1988) (describing the varying standards of care owed in a bailment as “either 
slight, ordinary, or great—and, accordingly, liability is imposed only for corresponding levels of 
negligence—gross, ordinary, or slight. Thus, a party held to a duty of slight care is liable for gross 
negligence; if the duty is one of ordinary care then liability will be imposed for only ordinary 
negligence; and if there is a duty of great care, the bailor is liable for mere slight negligence”). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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Another benefit arises from cooperating with the opposing party: the 
expectation of a reciprocal production of documents. Parties always fill the 
roles of both the producing and receiving party in discovery. While Party A 
may not receive a direct benefit from making a production of data to Party B, 
Party A will expect Party B to make a production in response to their own 
discovery requests. Arguably both parties receive the benefit of obtaining 
information from their opposing party in the broader discovery context. This 
suggests that this transaction is not for the sole benefit of the bailee, and thus 
the standard of extraordinary care does not apply to the discovery process. 
The transfer of information in discovery is mutually beneficial, and the 
guiding standard should be ordinary care. 
What constitutes ordinary care in data security should be understood 
through two prongs: “(1) what security measures the requesting party must 
have in place to protect the data and (2) what the requesting party must do 
in response to a breach of its security.”181 
First, the ordinary care standard considers what security measures make 
up a system of reasonable data security. Depending on the context, there is a 
great deal of variation as to what security measures are included in protective 
orders. In cases of extreme sensitivity, a producing party may only allow the 
ESI to be reviewed in a controlled environment on their own premises.182 
Parties might also include generalized provisions of protection requiring 
parties to utilize “industry standard practices” to protect the data.183 There is 
no catch-all provision for what is reasonable and what will satisfy ordinary 
care. The level of protection required will vary depending on the type of 
dispute and the information that is being transferred. 
The reasonableness of a receiving party’s data security measures depends 
on two vectors of proportionality: the value or complexity of the case and the 
value of the data involved. Smaller, low-value lawsuits have less at stake and 
will require less data security protection. Small cases may accordingly require 
less discovery, and the volume of data transferred may be smaller. By contrast, 
high-value, complex litigation may involve the transfer of millions of 
documents with significantly higher stakes. The sheer volume of data 
involved will naturally require more data security protection. 
The value of the data itself will also affect the obligation owed by the 
receiving party. High-value, confidential data will require more protection 
than low-value data. A proprietary, trade secret document is high-value data 
that is deserving of greater protection than a routine business email. Due to 
the proportionality requirement set forth in Rule 26(b)(1), the ordinary care 
 
181 Kessler et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
182 Id. at 3. 
183 Id. 
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standard effectively acts as a sliding scale based on the value of the litigation 
and the value and confidential nature of the data involved.184 
Second, the ordinary care standard should require a reasonable response 
by the receiving party when there is a data breach. It has become increasingly 
common for protective orders to include provisions requiring receiving 
parties to take certain actions in response to a hack or breach.185 Such 
provisions should require the receiving party to disclose to the producing 
party when a breach has occurred, as well as the extent of the breach, or even 
compel the requesting party to “investigate and remediate the effects of a 
breach.”186 No amount of security measures can prevent a data breach with 
one hundred percent success. It is not enough to simply put in place adequate 
security measures; the ordinary care standard should mandate that parties 
respond quickly and effectively to instances of data breach. 
If the bailment standard of ordinary care is formally established, 
subsequent litigation will help to flesh out our understanding of ordinary care. 
If a party’s ESI is hacked while in the possession of the receiving party and 
the receiving party fails to satisfy the ordinary care standard, the receiving 
party will be in violation of their discovery obligation. The judge tasked with 
ruling on the resulting motion will determine whether the security measures 
put in place by the receiving party were sufficient to satisfy ordinary care. 
With time, this new realm of discovery jurisprudence will further our 
understanding of what it means to have reasonable data security protections. 
CONCLUSION 
The solution to the rising threats to electronic data in the complex 
modern discovery process lies in the centuries-old principle of bailment. A 
bailment is simply defined as “the rightful possession of goods by one who is 
 
184 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (imposing a proportionality requirement on the scope of 
discovery that may be sought). 
185 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 54 (“If a Receiving Party or Authorized 
Recipient discovers any loss of Confidential Material or Highly Confidential Material or a breach 
of security, including any actual or suspected unauthorized access, relating to another party’s 
Confidential Material or Highly Confidential Material, the Receiving Party or Authorized Recipient 
shall: (1) promptly provide written notice to Disclosing Party of such breach; (2) investigate and 
make reasonable efforts to remediate the effects of the breach, and provide Disclosing Party with 
assurances reasonably satisfactory to Disclosing Party that such breach shall not recur; and (3) 
provide sufficient information about the breach that the Disclosing Party can reasonably ascertain 
the size and scope of the breach. The Receiving Party or Authorized Recipient agrees to cooperate 
with the Producing Party or law enforcement in investigating any such security incident. In any 
event, the Receiving Party or Authorized Recipient shall promptly take all necessary and appropriate 
corrective action to terminate the unauthorized access.”). 
186 Kessler et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
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not the owner.”187 As this Comment seeks to prove, the transfer of electronic 
information in the discovery process is a perfect fit for a bailment analysis. A 
receiving party obtains the electronic data of a producing party and possesses 
that intangible property for the course of litigation. When this separation of 
property and ownership occurs, a bailment is created. 
The Supreme Court in Seattle Times missed an opportunity to provide 
clarity and certainty as to what duty is owed by a receiving party to protect 
the data of a producing party in discovery. In the distant wake of the Seattle 
Times decision, this Comment calls on courts to set a clear standard. The 
transfer of data in discovery to an opposing party is akin to a mutually 
beneficial bailment. Therefore, the applicable standard that should guide the 
exchange of ESI is ordinary care. Ordinary care is perhaps the best standard 
to fit the needs of the discovery world, as it mirrors the existing core principle 
of discovery: reasonableness. Protections that satisfy ordinary care are 
protections that are inherently reasonable. 
If we assume that there is no common law, baseline standard of care owed 
by the receiving party, counsel for the producing party will effectively be 
required in every case to put provisions in a protective order binding the 
receiving party to take reasonable steps to protect transferred data. The 
production of data, without a protective order providing recourse for a data 
breach and an assurance that the data will be protected, would amount to data 
security negligence or malpractice on the part of counsel. Thus, the producing 
party will always demand contractual protections. It will be essential that 
“reasonable steps” is defined before any data is produced. 
It is also in the best interest of the receiving party to delineate exactly what 
“reasonable steps” mean before they receive the data. If the receiving party 
fails to negotiate their obligations at the forefront of the case, they will be 
forced to guess as to what security measures will satisfy “reasonable steps.” 
And, if a data breach occurs, the receiving party could be left without a set 
plan of action. The new system would provide a producing party with recourse 
in an instance of breach when a receiving party fails to satisfy reasonable 
steps.188 In any event, it is in the best interests of both the producing and 
receiving parties to create a protective order that clearly sets forth what steps 
must be taken to protect the data and what to do in the event of a breach. 
The resulting effects that a baseline standard of care will have on the 
protective order negotiation process cannot be understated. As the ordinary 
care standard becomes more robust over time, the efficiency of protective 
order negotiations will increase dramatically. A guiding standard will 
 
187 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 26, at § 53.1. 
188 Cf. Schaller, supra note 66, at 266 (noting that “[v]iolating a protective order can lead to 
serious consequences”). 
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introduce clarity in negotiations and make it easier for opposing parties to 
reach an agreement. An expedient and effective protective order negotiation 
process will both decrease overall discovery costs and ensure that litigants’ 
data is protected by reasonable data security measures. As data security 
threats continue to rise in the modern discovery world, clients will rest easy 
knowing that their data is kept safe and that litigation costs are controlled. 
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